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ABSTRACT 
Due to the open environment, all network systems suffer from various security threats. The remote user authentication 
scheme is a secure mechanism to allow users obtaining a variety of information services through insecure channels. 
For efficiency and security, many remote user authentication schemes identify users with smart cards. However, many 
smart card based schemes are vulnerable to lots of attacks. Recently, Hsiang et al. proposed a smart card based 
remote authentication scheme. In this article, we show that their scheme is vulnerable to the smart-card-loss-attack. 
That is, if an unauthorized person obtains the smart card, he/she can guess the correct password to masquerade as a 
legitimate user to login the system. The attack is caused by the smart card outputs fixed message for the same inputs. 
We propose an improved scheme to fix the flaw. The improved scheme withstands the off-line password guessing 
attack, parallel session attack and smart-card-loss-attack. Moreover, it also has the merits of providing mutual 
authentication, no verification table and users can freely update their passwords.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, people obtain a variety of information or 
services through networks. However, due to the open 
nature, all network systems always suffer various 
security threats. The remote user authentication 
scheme is a secure mechanism to allow users 
obtaining services through insecure channels [1-4], 
and it is the most common method used to check the 
validity of the login message and to authenticate the 
servers or users. A lot of authentication schemes also 
provide mutual authentication, key agreement and 
freely updating password. 
 
A remote user authentication scheme includes two 
main entities: servers and remote users. The 
communications between the servers and users 
are through insecure open channels. Thus, the 
security vulnerabilities of the remote user 
authentication scheme may occur due to the 
remote users, servers and insecure channels [5]. 
Many remote user authentication schemes identify 
users by using smart cards. However, many smart 
card based schemes are vulnerable to various 
attacks. Moreover, lots of schemes suffer the 
smart-card-loss-attack. The smart-card-loss-attack 
means an adversary can launch various attacks 
such as off-line guessing attack when he/she 
obtains a legitimate user’s smart card. 
 
 
In 1981, Lamport [6] proposed the first well-known 
remote password authentication scheme by using 
smart cards. However, Lamport's scheme has the 
drawbacks such as high hash overhead and 
requiring a password table at the server end. Until 
now, there are many smart card based password 
authentication schemes have been proposed [1, 5, 
7-9] to improve security, efficiency or to reduce 
costs. However, most schemes still cannot solve 
all possible problems and withstand all kinds of 
attacks [10-12]. 
 
Hwang et al. [7] proposed a smart card based remote 
password user authentication scheme to overcome 
the weakness in security. However, their scheme 
does not allow users to freely update passwords and 
it cannot withstand the masquerade attack either. In 
2002, Chien et al. [13] developed a remote user 
password authentication scheme to provide mutual 
authentication and freely updating password. But Ku 
et al. [14] showed that Chien et al.’s scheme is 
vulnerable to the reflection attack and the insider 
attack. Ku et al. also proposed an improved scheme 
to fix the flaws. However, Yoon et al. [15] indicated 
that the improved scheme was also susceptible to 
the parallel session attack, and then presented an 
improved scheme to enhance the security. 
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In 2009, Hsiang et al. [16] showed that Yoon et 
al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the parallel session 
attack, masquerading attack and password 
guessing attack. They also proposed an improved 
scheme to remedy the drawbacks. In this paper, 
we will show that Hsiang et al.’s scheme is 
vulnerable to the smart-card-loss-attack. If the 
smart card is lost, an unauthorized person can 
correctly guess the password and masquerade as 
the legitimate user to login the system. We also 
propose an improved scheme to fix the flaw. The 
improved scheme has the merits of mutual 
authentication, no verification table, and users can 
freely update their passwords. Moreover, the 
improved scheme withstands the off-line password 
guessing attack, parallel session attack and smart-
card-loss-attack.  
 
The remainder of this article is organized as 
follows. The notations used throughout this paper 
are listed in the next Section. In Section 3, we 
briefly describe Hsiang et al.’s remote user 
authentication scheme. Next, we show the smart-
card-loss-attack on their scheme in Section 4. The 
improvement scheme and its security analysis are 
presented in Sections 5. Finally, we make brief 
conclusions in Section 6.   
 
2. Preliminaries and notations  
 
Generally, a smart card based remote user 
authentication scheme comprises the following four 
phases: registration phase, login phase, 
authentication phase and password changing 
phase. In the registration phase, the user sends a 
registration request along with related information to 
the server via a secure channel. The server 
identifies the user and generates related messages 
to store in the smart card, and then delivers the card 
to the user. In the login phase, the user attaches 
his/her smart card into a card reader and keys in 
password to login the system. In the authentication 
phase, the server checks the validity of the login 
request. If the user is authenticated, the server 
allows the user to access the system. In the 
password changing phase, the remote users freely 
update their passwords. Some schemes allow the 
server and users to obtain mutual authentication 
and establish a common session key.  
 
All the notations used throughout this paper are 
listed as follows: 
(1) U :  A remote user. 
 
(2) UID :  The identity of the remote user U. 
 
(3) UPW : The password corresponding to the 
user U. 
 
(4) S : The server of the system. 
 
(5) x : The secret key of the server S.  
 
(6) )(h : A cryptographic secure one-way-hash 
function. 
 
(7) 䎩 : The bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation. 
 
(8) b, r : Random numbers. 
 
(9) ಩ : The concatenation operation.   
 
(10) }{: MBA䋻 : The entity A sends a message M 
to B through a secure channel. 
 
(11) }{: MBA䊻 : The entity A sends a message 
M to B through an open insecure channel. 
 
(12) AT Ǻ  A timestamp of the entity A. 
 
3. Hsiang et al.'s remote user authentication 
scheme 
 
In 2009, Hsiang et al. [16] pointed that Yoon et al.'s 
scheme [15] is vulnerable to the parallel session 
attack, masquerading attack, and password 
guessing attack. They proposed an improved 
scheme to fix the drawbacks. Hsiang et al.'s 
scheme comprises registration phase, login phase, 
authentication phase and password updating 
phase as follows. 
 
3.1 Registration phase 
 
In the registration phase, the user U registers with 
the server S by the following steps. 
 
Step R-1. Firstly, U chooses an identity UID  and 
password UPW . Then he/she computes )( UPWh  
and )( UPWbh 䎩  after generating a random 
number b. Next, U sends { UID , )( UPWh , 
)( UPWbh 䎩 } to S via a secure channel.  
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Step R-2. Upon receiving UID , )( UPWh , and 
)( UPWbh 䎩 , S creates an entry for U in the 
account database and stores 0=n  in the entry for 
the first registration. Otherwise, S sets 1+= nn  in 
the existing entry for U. Next, S computes  UEID , 
P , R  and V  as follows. 
 
)(= nIDhEID UU     (1) 
 
)(= xEIDhP U 䎩     (2) 
 
)(= UPWbhPR 䎩䎩     (3) 
 
))((= UPWhPhV 䎩     (4) 
 
At last, S stores V, R, and hash function )(h  into 
the smart card and sends it to U. 
 
Step R-3. Upon receiving the smart card, U keys in 
the random number b into the card. 
 
3.2 Login phase 
 
If the user U wants to log into the system, the 
steps of the login phase are as follows. 
 
Step L-1. The user U inserts his/her smart card 
into a card reader and keys in UID  and UPW . 
 
Step L-2. The smart card computes 1C  and 2C  as 
follows, where UT  is the user's current timestamp. 
 
)(= UPWbhRC 䎩䎩1     (5) 
 
)(= UTChC 䎩12     (6) 
 
Step L-3. SU䊻 : { UID , UT , 2C }. The user sends {
UID , UT , 2C } to the server. Note that =2C  
))(( UU TxEIDhh 䎩䎩 . 
 
3.3 Authentication phase 
 
Upon receiving { UID , UT , 2C }, the server S verifies 
the login message to authenticate the user by the 
following steps. 
 
Step A-1. The server S checks UID  and UT . If 
UID  is correct and UT  is in a valid time interval, S 
computes ))((=' UU TxEIDhhC 䎩䎩2 ; otherwise, S 
will reject the user's login request. If the 
computed result '2C  equals to the received 
message 2C , S accepts the login request and 
then computes 3C  as follows.  
 
))()((= SU ThxEIDhhC 䎩䎩3    (7) 
 
Where ST  is the server’s current timestamp. 
 
Step A-2. US䊻 : },{ 3CTS . The server sends 
},{ 3CTS  to the user. 
 
Step A-3. Upon receiving the message },{ 3CTS , U 
checks the timestamp ST . If ST  is in a valid time 
interval, U computes ))((=' SThChC 䎩13  and 
compares '3C  with the received 3C . The user U 
will authenticate the server S only if 33 CC ='  holds. 
 
3.4 Password changing phase  
 
If the user U wants to change his/her password, the 
steps of password changing phase are as follows. 
 
Step C-1. U inserts his smart card into the card 
reader and keys in his/her UID  and UPW . 
 
Step C-2. The smart card computes 䎩RP ='  
)( UPWbh 䎩  and ))('(=' UPWhPhV 䎩 . 
 
Step C-3. The smart card compares 'V  with the 
stored V. If they are not equal, the smart card 
rejects the request. Otherwise, U chooses a new 
password newUPW _  and proceeds to the next step.  
 
Step C-4. With the password newUPW _ , the smart 
card computes  )('=' _ newUPWbhPR 䎩䎩  and ='V   
))('( _ newUPWhPh 䎩 . Next, the smart card replaces 
R and V with R' and V', respectively.  
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4.-Smart-card-loss-attack on Hsiang et al.'s 
remote user authentication scheme 
 
Though Hsiang et al. declared that their scheme 
withstands the guessing attack, but recently He et 
al., by using differential power analysis (DPA), has 
shown that Hsiang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to 
the guessing attack and the masquerading attack 
[17]. The DPA attack is a method based on an 
analysis of the correlation between the electricity 
usage of a chip in a smart card and the encryption 
key it contains [18]. 
 
In this section, we will show the smart-card-loss-
attack on Hsiang et al.'s scheme. The smart-card-
loss-attack is more practical and more easily to be 
realized than DPA attack.  We start to describe the 
attack by the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1. For Hsiang et al.’s remote user 
authentication scheme, the smart card will output 
fixed 2C  if the same timestamp UT  and correct 
password UPW  are keyed into the card. 
 
Proof. Suppose that an adversary E wants to 
launch the smart-card-loss-attack on a user's 
smart card. E monitors the communications 
between the server and user. Suppose that the 
adversary intercepts message 2C  on a login 
session, where =)(= UTChC 䎩12 ))(( UTxEIDh 䎩䎩
. Next, the adversary obtains the smart card and 
starts a new session of login. E keys in the 
guessing password 'UPW , and the smart card 
computes )'(=' UPWbhRC 䎩䎩1 , where R and b 
are the secret information stored in the card and 
)()(= UPWbhxEIDhR 䎩䎩䎩 . Note that UPW  is 
the correct password used in the last login session. 
Hence the smart card will output '2C , where  
 
)'(=' UTChC 䎩12  
))'((= UU TPWbhRh 䎩䎩䎩  
))'())()(((= UUU TPWbhPWbhxEIDhh 䎩䎩䎩䎩䎩䎩 . 
 
If UU PWPW =' , then 
 
))((=' UTxEIDhhC 䎩䎩2  
2C=  
 
That is, the smart card will output a fixed 2C  if the 
adversary keys in the correct password and the 
same timestamp. The adversary can verify his/her 
guess of password by checking whether 22 CC ='  
holds. Q.E.D. 
 
The attack is based on the assumption that the 
adversary obtains the legitimate user's smart card. 
The assumption is reasonable in the real world, 
especially for some VIPs, any adversary always 
wants to get the cards to obtain benefits or to hurt 
someone though it is illegal.  
 
If the adversary E wants to adopt the smart-card-
loss-attack on Hsiang et al.’s scheme, the steps of 
the attack are described in details as follows. 
 
Step D-1. Firstly, E intercepts },,{ 2CTID U  on a 
login session. 
 
Step D-2. E steals the smart card or gets the card 
by any means.  
 
Step D-3. E inserts the card into a card reader and 
keys in UT . Next, she inputs the guessed 
password 'UPW .    
 
Step D-4. The smart card computes and outputs '2C . 
 
Step D-5. E checks whether 22 CC ='  holds. The 
guessed password is correct if 22 CC =' ; otherwise, 
E repeats the Step D-3 to D-5 until the exact 
password is found.     
 
Usually, for ease of memory, the bit-length of the 
password is quite short. Thus it is very quickly to 
correctly guess the password. For illustration, the 
smart-card-loss-attack is shown in Figure 1. 
 
5. The improved scheme 
 
The smart-card-loss-attack on Hsiang et al.’s 
scheme is caused by the smart card outputs fixed 
2C  when the user inputs the same timestamp and 
password. If the output 2C  is varied on each login 
session for the same inputs, the attack will be 
avoided. The improved scheme is described as 
follows. Note that the registration phase and the 
password changing phase of the improved scheme 
are the same as Hsiang et al.’s scheme. 
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5.1 Login phase 
 
The steps of the login phase are modified as follows. 
 
Step L-1*. The user U inserts his/her smart card 
into a card reader and keys in UID  and UPW . 
 
Step L-2*. The smart card computes 1C  ,  2C  and 
3C  as follows, where UT  is the user's current 
timestamp and r is a random number. 
 
)(= UPWbhRC 䎩䎩1     (8) 
 
)(= UTrChC 䎩䎩12     (9) 
 
rChC 䎩13 )(=                (10) 
 
Step L-3*. SU 䊻 : },,,{ 32 CCTID UU . The user sends 
the login information },,,{ 32 CCTID UU  to the server. 
 
5.2 Authentication phase   
 
The steps of the authentication phase are as follows. 
 
Step A-1*. After receiving },,,{ 32 CCTID UU , the 
server checks UID  and UT . If UID  is incorrect or 
UT  is not in a valid time interval, the server 
terminates the login steps. Otherwise, the server 
computes 1C , r’ and '2C by   
 
)(= xEIDhC 䎩1                          (11) 
 
)(=' 13 䎩 ChCr                (12) 
 
 
)'(=' UTrChC 䎩䎩12               (13) 
 
Then the server compares '2C  with the received 
2C . If 22 CC =' , the server accepts the user's login 
request and computes 4C  by   
 
))((= SThrChC 䎩䎩14               (14) 
 
Where ST  is the server’s current timestamp. 
 
Step A-2*. US䊻 : },{ 4CTS . The server forwards 
},{ 4CTS  to the user.  
 
Step A-3*. Upon receiving the message },{ 4CTS , U 
checks the timestamp ST . If ST  is in a valid time 
interval, U computes ))((=' SThrChC 䎩䎩14  and 
thereby compares '4C  with the received 4C . The 
user and the server obtain mutual authentication if 
44 CC =' . 
 
5.3 Discussions and security analysis 
 
The improved scheme has the merits of providing 
mutual authentication, no verification table, and 
freely updating password. Due to only exclusive-OR 
and hash function operations are adopted in the 
smart card, the computation cost of the proposed 
scheme is quite low. The pseudo random number 
generator is built in the computer of the user end. 
Thus the proposed scheme is easy and practical for 
implementation. A simple comparison on security 
among our scheme and other smart card based 
authentication schemes are listed in Table 1. Note 
Figure 1. The Smart-card-loss-attack on Hsiang et al.’s scheme. 
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that we assume that the DPA method is not adopted 
on all attacks, the secret information },,{ bRV  in the 
smart card is unknown by any adversary or any 
malicious insiders. 
 
Schemes Guessing attack 
Insider 
attack 
Reflection 
attack 
Smart-card- 
loss-attack 
Ku et al.'s 
[14] 3 3 3 3 
Chien et 
al.'s [13] 2 3 3 3 
Yoon et 
al.'s [15] 2 2 3 3 
Hsiang et 
al.'s [16] 2 2 3 3 
Ours 
scheme 2 2 2 2 
 
Table1. Comparison of the smart card based 
authentication schemes. 
 
The scheme withstands the smart-card-loss-
attack, off-line password guessing attack, and 
parallel session attack. The security analysis is 
described as follows. 
 
(1) It can resist the smart-card-loss-attack. 
 
In the Step L-3* of the login phase, the user sends 
},,,{ 32 CCTID UU  to the server, where =2C  
)( UTrCh 䎩䎩1 , rChC 䎩13 )(=  and 䎩1 RC =  
)( UPWbh 䎩 . The server authenticates the user by 
verifying 2C . Because the random number r is 
included in 2C , thereby 2C  value varied on each 
login session. The ever changed 2C   to result in the 
adversary cannot verify her guessing. Thus the 
improved scheme resists the smart-card-loss-attack. 
 
(2) It can withstand the off-line password guessing 
attack. 
 
Suppose the adversary E wants to adopt off-line 
guessing attack on the improved scheme. E 
intercepts },,,{ 32 CCTID UU  from Step L-3*. Since 
)(= UTrChC 䎩䎩12  and rChC 䎩13 )(= , it is 
infeasible for the adversary E to obtain 1C  or r 
from 2C  and 3C . Similarly, if E intercepts },{ 4CTS  
from Step A-2*, it is also difficult to recover 1C  or r 
due to ))((= SThrChC 䎩䎩14 . Even if 1C  or r are 
known by the adversary, due to 䎩1 RC =  
)( UPWbh 䎩 , it is also difficult for the adversary to 
guess password since R and b are unknown. Thus 
the improved scheme withstands the off-line 
password guessing attack.   
 
(3) It can avoid the parallel session attack. 
 
Parallel session attack is resulted from symmetric 
computations of response messages on both the 
server and smart card ends. In the improved scheme, 
suppose that the adversary E wants to mount the 
parallel session attack by initiating a parallel session. 
When a legitimate user U sends the login request 
},,,{ 32 CCTID UU  to the server, E also sends 
},,',{ 32 CCTID UU  to the server. However, the server 
will check 2C  to authenticate the user. Note that 
)(= UTrChC 䎩䎩12 , thus the parallel session attack 
will be detected by the server with the following two 
cases: (1) If UU TT ='  the replay request is detected 
by S due to the presence of the same timestamp; (2) 
If UU TT 䍴' the parallel session attack will be detected 
by checking 2C . Thus the improved scheme 
withstands the parallel session attack. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Smart card based password authentication 
scheme is a very widely used mechanism to allow 
users to access information or services through 
networks. However, many smart card based 
password authentication schemes are vulnerable 
to the smart-card-loss-attack. That is, an adversary 
can launch various attacks to get benefits or to hurt 
the cardholder when he/she obtains the smart 
card. The main contributions of this paper are: 
 
(1) We have shown that Hsiang et al.'s remote 
user authentication scheme is vulnerable to 
smart-card-loss-attack. If an unauthorized person 
obtains the smart card, he can guess the 
password to masquerade as the legitimate user to 
login the system. 
 
(2) We have proposed an improved scheme to fix 
the flaws. The improved scheme has the merits of 
providing mutual authentication, no verification 
table and users can freely update their passwords. 
The improved scheme can resist the smart-card-
loss-attack, off-line password guessing attack and 
parallel session attack. 
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